Despite decolonisation, France had never ceased to maintain its presence in Africa and to keep a zone of influence in the continent, in the face of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, then Russia since the 1990s[1]. France is also currently facing increased competition from Turkey and China, in Africa[2]. This rivalry is accelerated by destabilisation and conflict events (coups, jihadism)[3]. One example is Mali, where Russian-trained leaders are reportedly negotiating the arrival of troops from the Russian group Wagner[4]. If Bamako officially confirms these negotiations, France and its European partners present will suffer severely, for several reasons.
The establishment of the Wagner group will give more ground to France's rivals[5]. In this case, Russia will increase its already economically and politically important area of influence in Africa[6]. Algeria, one of Moscow's main partners, has closed its airspace to French military aircraft, complicating European anti-jihadist military support in the Sahel under Operation Barkhane [7].
In place since 2014, bringing together more than 5,000 French soldiers accompanied by Danish and Estonian troops, the operation has not helped the government in Bamako regain control of the jihadist-controlled north of the country[8]. Moreover, in the face of this failure, French President Macron has decided to reduce the number of soldiers stationed in Mali[9]. However, African leaders, including Malians, will continue to seek military support from other countries, such as Turkey, China and even Russia[10]. France views this change in partnership negatively, and threatens to disengage. However, it contributes to an increased military role in Africa for France's rivals, which will not be without consequences (increased presence of the Wagner group in Africa).
In the event of inaction or downsizing in the Sahel against the Wagner group, Paris risks losing a key ally (the United States) in ensuring stability and security in the Sahel[11]. Moreover, other countries involved in Operation Barkhane, such as Estonia, are reportedly threatening to withdraw from Mali[12]. Despite possible options such as transferring troops to neighbouring Niger, the West fears a domino effect that could weaken Western troops in Africa[13].
In the Central African Republic, France had already frozen its budgetary aid and military cooperation because of Russian military involvement in Bangui[14]. Despite the warnings of the French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly towards Mali in case of official involvement of the Wagner group in the country (losing its international support) and the reassuring words on the French military presence in the Sahel at all costs[15]Russian influence, now growing, will contribute to a geopolitical weakening of France[16]. It may also aggravate tensions between France and its former colonies in Africa[17].
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August 2021. The Biden administration signs the end of the American intervention in Afghanistan, after twenty years of presence in the country, suffering war after war since the Soviet invasion (1979)[1]. In response to this disengagement, many regional actors are mobilising to ensure the stability of the state that recently fell to the Taliban[2]. Apart from Russia, Turkey and Qatar for geostrategic reasons (migration crisis, neighbourhood stability, national interests), the countries most involved in the Afghan crisis are Afghanistan's neighbours Iran, Pakistan, the Central Asian countries and China.[3].
Afghanistan's neighbouring country, sharing a common border of 76 km and diplomatically present in the country since 1955[4]China remains more committed than ever to invest in its neighbourhood in general, and had already advanced its pawns at the gates of Afghanistan, notably through the Silk Road (economy, infrastructures) as well as political and military alliances (Iran, Central Asian countries)[5]. Despite the instabilities, Afghanistan is not neglected and remains an object of desire for the Chinese government[6]. Diplomatic efforts and new investment attempts illustrate this very well[7].
In the summer of 2021, numerous meetings in China, specifically in Beijing and Tianjin, were held between Afghan, Taliban and Chinese representatives to ensure the continuation of the Chinese presence in Afghanistan and the Taliban's security commitments, for various reasons[8].
Firstly, Afghanistan is close to the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which has a Muslim majority (Uyghur) and is plagued by both separatism and Islamic terrorism (anti-Chinese attacks)[9].
Secondly, Afghanistan has important natural resources (rare earths, lithium), which are vital both for Chinese industry and for the Taliban in search of economic support[10].
Finally, China is striving to ensure the territorial integrity of the country and the stability of countries in which it has entered into major energy and infrastructure contracts, such as Pakistan[11].
The speeches of Chinese officials, including the chief (Wang Yi) and the diplomatic spokesmen and the ambassador in Kabul (Mr. Cong Peiwu), show that the Beijing government is advancing its position in Afghanistan in a security and economic discourse, and this, in a context of geographical proximity[12]. China is keen to keep Afghanistan within its sphere of influence.
Since the late 2000s, relations between Western countries, Israel and Turkey have become strained for several reasons. Firstly, progress in the negotiations for Turkey's entry into the EU has stalled[1]. Then, the Cypriot question is still unresolved following Turkey's categorical refusal to recognise the Greek side and to withdraw its military troops from the northern (Turkish) part of the island[2]. Finally, Turkey is increasingly turning to Palestine, which is prompting Israel to look to other countries to secure its national interests[3].
As a result of regional tensions, three countries in the Eastern Mediterranean - Greece, Cyprus and Israel - have signed important military and energy alliances[4].
Indeed, various air exercises involving the three countries, including INIOCHOS in April 2021, have taken place in Greece[5]. However, all three countries are also concerned with energy supply[6]. The gas deposits in Cypriot and Israeli waters have provided a unique opportunity not only to secure an alternative supply route to that from Russia and Turkey with the Turkish Stream pipeline, but also to reduce energy dependence on these two countries mentioned above[7]. Indeed, Cyprus, Greece and Israel have recently signed a gas pipeline project (East Med) that would link the gas fields of the Eastern Mediterranean not only to Greece, but also to Italy (!)[8]. In addition, to improve the electricity network, the three countries have resolved to build a submarine cable that would link Israel to Greece via Cyprus[9]. These trilateral projects have attracted the attention of the European Commission, which sees them as beneficial to Europe and its gas and electricity supply[10].
Of course, this alliance and its regional influence are also subject to internal and local constraints. Arab-Israeli tensions and their geopolitical consequences on the international scene have led Greece and Cyprus to maintain separate contacts with certain neighbouring countries, such as Lebanon, Palestine, as well as Egypt and Jordan[11]. However, the Abraham Accords, as well as the PHILIA Forum and the Paphos Summit, gave the Trilateral Alliance the opportunity to increase its geopolitical network in Europe as well as in the Middle East (Gulf Arab countries)[12].
Given their geographical location and potential as an East-West Mediterranean energy corridor, the Greece-Cyprus-Israel alliance can provide the West with a new geopolitical tool, and even become a new key player on the international scene in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, the alliance's initiatives are not only supported by EU member states such as France and Italy, but are also attracting attention and interest on the other side of the Atlantic (USA).[13].
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Nowadays, much of the news focuses on the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, especially in relation to the EU's foreign policy in the Middle East. Indeed, for geopolitical reasons, Turkey was and still is considered a vital partner for the European Union[1]. However, there is little focus in the news on the role of member states in geopolitics. As an example, we can name the case of Greece[2].
Straddling the Balkans, North Africa and Asia, Greece is geographically very well situated and remains attractive to many investors. However, it faces great rivalry with Turkey, led by Erdogan, and its allies[3]. Even Western Europe is concerned about this, especially following the recent fact that French ships were patrolling with Greek ships in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean[4].
In recent years, in order to counterbalance Turkish influence, Greece had increased its contacts with its neighbours, especially with countries that have difficult relations with Turkey. Apart from Cyprus and Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had established numerous military alliances with Greece, and military exercises had become frequent over the years[5]. Several official meetings and regional summits have been organised. The most recent ones include the PHILIA Forum in Athens in February 2021[6]and the Paphos (Cyprus) Summit in April 2021[7]. Greek officials had also increased contacts with their Bahraini, Jordanian, Palestinian and Iraqi counterparts[8]. Even in Damascus, the Greek embassy was recently reopened[9].
In the current context that Turkey is increasingly turning towards the East, mainly Russia and Iran[10]In the light of this, we must more than necessarily question the role of the EU member states in geopolitics, especially in order to provide the European level with room for manoeuvre against both their rivals and partners[11] . Given that even the United States has deepened relations with Greece[12]In addition, it is possible to ask whether Greece has become a new bridge between Europe and the Middle East.
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In recent years, with the tensions remaining between the European institutions, media coverage routinely reports on the different partnerships between Eastern European countries such as the Visegrád Group of Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary[1]. However, there is another, much less publicised partnership involving Eastern European countries: the Three Seas Initiative (TSI).
Formed in 2015 by Polish President Andrzej Duda and his then Croatian counterpart, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović[2]Like the Visegrád countries, the Initiative brings together the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia and Croatia.[3].
At the first summit in Dubrovnik in 2016, the 12 leaders of the member countries adopted a Joint Declaration on "Cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, digital and economy"[4]. As President Duda pointed out, the Initiative is "about Central European regional cooperation on concrete projects, carried out within the framework of the EU and contributing to greater cohesion and regional development of the Union".[5].
However, since former US President Donald Trump's visit to Warsaw on the occasion of the second Three Seas Initiative summit (2017), the leaders have increased their cooperation on energy and defence sectors[6]. Indeed, they are banking on a stronger integration of the region in energy matters (particularly for gas) with a growing presence of the United States in the global liquefied gas market (LNG). This, in the context of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, does not reassure Eastern Europe, and pushes for a diversification of energy supplies[7]. In addition, at the Warsaw summit, former Croatian President Grabar-Kitarović announced an expert preparation of 157 energy, transport and telecommunication infrastructure projects, worth about EUR 50 billion. These projects include the North-South gas corridor connecting the Baltic to the Adriatic, in which the Polish terminal in Świnoujście will be connected to the Croatian terminal on the island of Krk (under construction), as well as the gas inter-connectors between Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, a branch of which connects Hungary[8]. Officials are currently working on the Baltic Pipe pipeline, which would allow gas to be supplied to Central Europe from Norway (via Denmark) from the LNG terminal in Świnoujście[9].
Other road and rail infrastructure projects are also underway, such as the Via Carpatia and Rail Baltica[10]. The Via Carpatia is to link the Lithuanian port city of Klaipėda (Baltic Sea) to Thessaloniki (Aegean Sea) via Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, while the Rail Baltica aims to link Warsaw to Tallinn and even Helsinki via Lithuania and Latvia[11].
Finally, at the summit in Ljubljana (Slovenia) in June 2019, two Polish and Romanian investment banks announced the creation of a Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, in which 9 of the 12 countries are currently participating, in parallel with the European programmes[12]. The fund is estimated at just over €1.2 billion (including €750 million from Poland) and should eventually reach €5 billion with contributions from I3M member countries, international financial institutions and private institutional investors[13].
In September 2019, the presidents of the financial centres of the Visegrád Group countries (V4: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and three other countries of the Three Seas Initiative (Romania, Croatia and Slovenia) announced their intention to create a common stock exchange index, the CEEplus[14].
The Three Seas Initiative is therefore a Union within the Union in that it works for better North-South connections, not just West-East as has traditionally been the case. In parallel to the European Union, it is working for a deeper socio-economic development of the Central and Eastern European countries. Indeed, according to statistical data, the 12 member countries represent 30 % of the EU's surface, 25 % of its population, and almost 20 % of its GDP[15].
German President Steinmeier recently underlined the importance of this Initiative, supporting its further Europeanisation ("to become part of European policies and investment instruments") on the occasion of the last summit held in Sofia (Bulgaria) in July 2021[16]. Moreover, the European Commission remains a major contributor to infrastructure investments in the I3M countries, from the Adriatic to the Baltic and the Black Sea[17].
Apart from Germany and the United States, many countries were invited to the I3M summits, such as Greece and Japan[18]. The Initiative also has geopolitical plans to consolidate American and European influence against that of Russia and China[19]. This importance comes at a time when European leaders are mobilising, following the destabilisation of Ukraine (Crimea, Donbass)[20]for a military reinforcement of NATO's eastern flank. While the Initiative's leaders are also working to compete with the Belt Road Initiative developed by China[21].
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Nowadays, society in the West is confronted with an increasingly worrying phenomenon, namely radical Islam. Questions are increasingly being asked about how to deal with it[1]. However, many media, political and academic figures address these problems without analysing the causes. Today, we are witnessing a repetition of errors that have happened before[2]. The West's actions towards radical Islam are very similar to those towards Iran at the time of the 1978-1979 revolution, and again to those towards the Arab countries in 2010-2011[3]. It is interesting to recall that the leaders in the countries mentioned were already confronted with the problem of radical Islam and were working to contain it[4].
However, since that time, Western governments have adopted an approach that mainly focuses on human rights and democracy, to the detriment of the reality on the ground in the Middle East (socio-cultural differences)[5]. The same decisions were taken with regard to Tunisia, Egypt and Syria[6]. In both cases, the results were not long in coming (aggravated political crisis, increased repression, civil war)[7].
These events show the drawbacks and shortcomings of the design of the soft power in the West, especially in Europe. Nowadays, the European Union, and to some extent the United States, are working more on promoting values such as human rights and democracy, and sanctioning various countries that officially do not respect them (Iran, Syria,...)[8].
In the light of current events since the 1970s, the Western policy of promoting values has had mixed results. While it has contributed to the socio-economic development of the European neighbourhood, it has also created phenomena such as migration crises that have partially exported radical Islam to the West, as has been observed since 2015 (attacks, growing urban insecurity, unrest at external borders) in Europe[9]. The picture of Western sanctions also has a dark side, in that they have not contributed to regime and/or governance change, let alone to the eradication of radical Islam[10]. They have also led to a deepening of relations between countries that pose a problem to the West[11]. We can recall the cases of Syria and Iran which have increased their contacts with China and Russia[12]. Moreover, the latter two countries have a significant sphere of influence in the world, including in Africa and Latin America[13]. Through such a geopolitical network, it is noted that the promotion of values and the sanctioning of non-compliance are not only ineffective but also easily circumvented[14]. They have sometimes had the opposite effect (civil war, humanitarian crisis,...), which has partly contributed to the spread of radical Islam in the West[15]. One cannot conclude that the West has unwillingly given more space to radical Islam in its own territory.
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In order to develop the market in which we wish to establish ourselves - namely new technologies as close as possible to the users - in this society on the move that is Iran, it is necessary to take into account the latest events on an international scale and to take advantage of them when they allow it.
From the results of the US elections to the rise of Russian and Asian influence on the world stage, our group needs to know what position to adopt in order to maintain the lead that seems to be its in establishing a certain hegemony of our products on Iranian soil, but also in the idea of making France a country of support for the Iranian government, without harming the treaties and contracts between it and the nations that wish to see Iran on the fringes of the global economy. Consequently, it is a work of meticulous research and a certain diplomacy that interests our study, which could be translated into a question of the following kind: what opportunities can be seized to develop French foreign trade in our field?
In his first week in office, the new president strikes the final blow to the Middle East problem; trade with Iran is promised to be forgotten. Such violence could be legitimate in view of Trump's international financial alliances and biases. On the one hand, the oil-producing countries of the Arabian Peninsula remain the US's main supplier of black gold; consequently, the contemporary and religious games that animate relations between these countries, whose powers are Sunni, and Iran, with its Shiite majority. This dissension is the ideal pretext for the presidential administration to move away from the commitments and promises of openness put on the negotiating table by the Obama administration. Such a turnaround is also a hand out to Israel, which, although a country that does not like anyone because it distrusts everything, tolerates certain exchanges with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula - for oil - and which, therefore, abhorred Barack Obama's arrangements with Iran. Persia represents nothing but a potential and powerful enemy for an Israeli people interested in a re-establishment of the Great Ancient Israel. However, if the Persians managed to join all the developed countries in terms of technology, market, finance and military power, the Hebrew will would be ruined because the Iranians already have a force capable of keeping them in check, but above all of invading them if the US were to put an end to the protection it has put in place since 1948 in the region.
Such opposition to Iran goes hand in hand with a certain unhealthy view of the European Union on the part of the President. Indeed, the various crises through which our continent has passed, notably over the last five years, the near global collapse of the Union's economic, political and social system, offers a spectacle that at first sight is not very engaging for the world. Added to this are the upcoming elections in France and Germany, which promise to be a moral and diplomatic tragedy; like 'America first', many radical political parties have been reinforced in their isolationist intentions just like Trump. However, the point of conflict is not only the desire to protect the American market, but above all the idea that the European Union is weak and fragile in the eyes of the American presidency. The EU is an incomparable market, but its internal dissension, lack of military power and desire for independence from the US dollar are all silly points. The Brexit is a testimony to this weakness of a Europe unable to hold back its most powerful members, unable to protect its borders, unable to see beyond historical prejudices to bring Turkey and Russia within its borders, if not physically, then at least economically.
This is a second bone of contention between the US and the EU, a second added value to our industrial approach.
The great revolution that Trump has brought is his attraction to Russia, his willingness to forge strong links between the Russian economy and that of his country. It is a willingness to go beyond past conflicts, to return to the modern world in the Tsarist era, when the US and Russia had no great reason to be in conflict. It is an international warming that makes us forget the Cold War and the oppositions born of the power strategies of the two great ones of this world over the last forty years. Such a rapprochement is a sign to the world that instead of having the USA as the sole guardian of the world balance - a guardian that sows trouble wherever it goes - we will have an unsurpassable economic power allied to the greatest military force of the old continent and Asia. For the economy as well as for global security, this could be a bad thing, as it is understood that Russia, if it were to side with the Americans, would have no other obstacle than the agreements to be reached with the Americans on the modus operandi on a global scale in the fields of finance, military and diplomacy. The end of such a division of power patterns would allow the US to finish off China, Europe, India and allow itself to develop Africa for its own benefit.
However, such an approach is tricky because the Russians have deeper and stronger ties with many steps than they do with the US, which still remains the primary international adversary of US hegemonic intentions. The ex-USSR giant's unfailing ardour and inventiveness have kept all American military and social experts on their toes in recent decades. Today, the establishment of such an alliance would be subject to a repositioning of Russia in its engagements with partners such as China, India and Iran for what interests us. A delicate move.
In terms of the development of our company, but also in relation to the opportunities for France opened up by such reversals of situation, in the idea of a new link to be woven with Iran, recent events are a real opportunity. Indeed, from a simply diplomatic point of view, France now has free rein in Iran since the United States is going to increase its sanctions against the Persians, but is also going to loosen the grip of the European Union, which the new American presidency is completely discrediting. With some caution, especially with regard to Turkey, the countries of the Arab peninsula and Israel - which France since Charles De Gaulle has respected only out of a desire to be benevolent and responsible in the face of a world that points its finger at it for the Vel-d'Hiv, but also because it suits its business with the United States - the French powers that be, which we are almost certain will fall into the hands of Emmanuel Macron (a great defender of businessmen), will have complete freedom to open the doors of the Iranian Empire and its markets.
Moreover, if an effective rapprochement between the US and Russia were to take place, our group, whose purpose is to research and develop new technologies - in aviation, transport, mobile and connected technologies - would see a reduction in commercial contracts between the Russians and the Persians, who would feel betrayed; who would certainly feel betrayed because such an alliance between the two old enemies would imply a reneging on the alliances of the former Soviet power with the marginalised of the developed world. Moreover, a US move away from European actions, but especially from its finances and economy, would bring a new air to trade between its members. If the US abandons us, Germany will lose its stick of support, the British their means of influence with the continentals, and France would regain its place as the leading force at the centre of Europe. However, with a conduct worthy of meeting the challenges of tomorrow, the French could help maintain the European Union, strengthen cooperation between companies, while supporting the steps of its industrialists abroad, particularly in Iran.
The scenario in preparation is not catastrophic, but it calls for sensitivity and a capacity to foresee general movements on the part of the powers around, as well as the markets and other industrialists in our sector. However, an even greater sidelining of Iran on the international scene, a desire to turn it into a new territory of terrorists, is an opportunity for us who, by embodying an outstretched hand, a tolerant and unprejudiced power, will enter the Persian market, into their society without difficulty; granting us from the outset almost all the opportunities for the development of our industry, and the benefits that this represents.
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It is a mistake to assume that diplomacy can always settle international disputes if there is "good faith" and "willingness to come to an agreement".
Henry A. Kissinger
Contemporary diplomacy, whose traditional understanding proposes to apprehend "the manner of conducting the external affairs of a subject of international law through peaceful means and primarily through negotiation"[1]In addition to multilateral organisations, it is characterised by a broad conception of the conduct of state affairs that includes a multitude of non-state actors - also called non-governmental organisations. Given its complexity, this instrument remains one of the major components of a country's power. Consequently, diplomatic practices are subject to continuous readjustment[2]The European Union has a long history of working with the private sector, requiring innovative approaches to effectively defend national interests.
The fight against terrorism remains one of the priorities of the current US administration. As President Obama stressed at the recent White House Summit on Countering Violent ExtremismTerrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State pose an "urgent" threat[3] to the security of the United States as well as that of American allies and partners. Although there is a certain continuity in US counter-terrorism policy, it is inevitable that we agree with Tina Kaidanow, Coordinator of the State Department's Office of Counter-Terrorism, that the nature of the terrorist threat is varied and continues to evolve, requiring a constant adaptation of the US approach[4].
The global dimension of the terrorist threat makes diplomacy a central institution in US government counter-terrorism efforts, with close links to foreign diplomatic detachments. Indeed, as Haris Pesto notes, " the fight against a terrorist network such as the one including Al Qaeda requires the cooperation of numerous countries, since the network is active around the world. Efficient anti-terrorist diplomacy consolidates all these activities into a coherent whole "[5].
Colin Powell said: " diplomacy constitutes this nation's first line of defence and also one of our most potent offensive weapons in the war on terrorism "[6]. Therefore, in order to discern the weight of modern diplomacy in the US counter-terrorism strategy, the question to be asked is: "What are the main US characteristics in the fight against the threats posed by these terrorist groups?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine the methods used by US diplomacy to build coalitions and cooperation with its international partners. These methods, which include direct diplomacy, the diplomacy of international organisations, so-called 'expeditionary diplomacy', as well as public diplomacy, will be the focus of this analysis.
Diplomacy is still an essential part of the United States' overall strategy in the fight against international terrorism. At the same time, terrorism is an ever more topical and, in some parts of the world, urgent threat. This danger, whose nature is constantly evolving over time, tends to focus, according to the coordinator of the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism, Tina Kaidanow, on local objectives[62]. Thus, US diplomacy engages directly with the actors of this cooperation at all levels - international, national, regional and local[63]. 63] Moreover, in an increasingly complex environment, this arrangement encompasses a multitude of non-state actors. A key aspect of US diplomacy negotiations is to support the effort to develop the counter-terrorism capabilities of US partners. US assistance and coordination with allied and partner countries is provided primarily through multiple bilateral meetings. Secretary of State Kerry plays a key role in this respect. However, multilateral cooperation - such as the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF) or the recent White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism - remains a key factor in American diplomatic strategy. The same is true of international and regional organisations, which allow the United States to limit, to a certain extent, the financial costs of various external operations, as well as to acquire greater legitimacy in the fight against terrorism. It is important to emphasise that the fight against terrorism is, for the US administration, above other international issues, which means that the US does not exclude extending an allied hand to countries whose political characteristics are only marginally, if at all, compatible with those of the US[64]. 64] Since the primary objective of US diplomacy is to ensure that terrorists have no place that can be characterised as a 'safe haven', expeditionary diplomacy is an indispensable component of this overall diplomatic strategy. Indeed, its task is to provide effective access to information on the ground and to ensure constant communication with international partners. The role of public diplomacy in the fight against terrorism is also crucial to the success of the US global diplomatic strategy. International partners' understanding of objectives is fundamental to building international coalitions and cooperation. The usefulness of public diplomacy is further enhanced by the fact that its spectrum of influence extends beyond political representatives to publics in countries affected by terrorism, as well as to activists themselves. The effectiveness of this approach is enhanced by the increased use of cyber technologies, which have become a key aspect of the efforts. In fineThe primary characteristic of US diplomacy is the desire to bring together as many actors as possible to join forces against the threat of international terrorism.
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The real decision-making process is fundamentally based on the President's Obama staff, i.e. a small inner circle of advisors who forged their relationships with him during his 2008 campaign. It is essentially the President Obama himself who decides, after consulting some aspects within this inner circle of advisors. It is principally the Chief of Staff McDonough one of his spin doctors and bolsterers), the most trustful to the President. Then comes S. Rice, the National Security Advisor. Those, along with the rest of the inner circle, constitute the "in-group"The President's loyalists enjoying the privileged access to him. The rest of the intuitive advisors constitute the "out-group"This echoes a typical characteristic of the Obama administration, suffering from Vertical Dyad Linkage (Danserau), as the leader develops different relationships with each structure. This echoes a typical characteristic of the Obama administration, suffering from Vertical Dyade Linkage (Danserau), as the leader develops different relationships with each structure. Furthermore, most characteristics of the present case tend to show that a formal structure regulates the hierarchical relationships.
In fact, the decision making process is closed essentially to the President's loyalists, with result a lack of brainstorming outside the in-group. Even if different options are on the table, they are not considered and even if the objectives fail to be reached, the strategies are not reassessed. As well, Obama doesn't have, in his inner circle of advisors, someone who could play the role of the devil's advocate.
The decision-making process is marked by strong divisions and tensions between civilian and military spheres, which can be notably illustrated by the divergences between the Department of Defense and the White House. The main reason of such tensions is that the decision-making process is biased in the sense that the President lacks trust in other institutional advisors such as the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State. This results in the lack of consultationsessentially with the Pentagon. Despite the fact that the Department of Defense shares another view on the strategy necessary to fight ISIS, it is not taken into consideration, even after a significant period of time marked by unreached objectives of Obama's policy. As a result, bureaucratic divisions, materialized in dysfunctions, were a key element hindering the construction of a clear cut strategy on the long term.
However, a positive factor is the fact that despite different views on the strategy in place, Kerry, Hagel or Dempsey publicly tried to demonstrate their support for the Obama's strategy. Indeed, there were also some examples of good cooperation as it was the case between Kerry and Obama in the effort to constitute an international coalition against ISIS.
The public opinion has always played a key role toward Obama's presidency. In the present case, the videos of the beheadings of American journalists have had a massive impact on the public opinion in America, as a kind of "CNN effect"has followed. This has had a significant role on the construction of the strategy which, also in its further adaptations, will always follow the polls as shows the refusal of sending troops on the ground (the percentage of people wanting airstrikes was actually the same of those against sending ground troops). This gives credit to the pluralist model.
The Congress, far from being a factor itself, Obama tends to use it for his own political games. Asking for its approval when he actually doesn't want to intervene (knowing he won't get it), and refusing it when he wants to act, under the claim of AUMF or the War Powers Act.
Right into Rystadt's misperception theory, Obama's attitude once again proves that the president has the dangerous tendency to distort the reality, in order to adapt it to his perceptual predisposition, biasing thereby the whole decision-making process. Indeed, he first described ISIS as a JV team (Junior Varsity team) in the medias, underestimating the threat, continuing to push his agenda in order to comfort own vision of the world through which "the tide of war is receding". Protecting his core beliefshe was opposed to the sending of troops on the ground for combat missions, ignoring the experts' advices by permanent "consistency reducing techniques"through a process of selective interpretation enabling him to stay in Lambro's fantasy circle where his wishful thinking seems all so real.
Furthermore, with a High cognitive complexityhe also proves Herman right as the concerned case is an illustration of his difficulties to take a decision by himself urgently, never getting enough information, and it gives him the award of the Duroselle's "Cautious"decision maker.
The idiosyncratic analysis of such situation emphasizes notably his egowhich plays an important role when a decision-maker is that much cut-off from reality and this strongly tends to indicate that polls stating a regression in his popularity might have been notable variables into the way he "handled"the crisis. We can also notice that stress-related reactions might be pointed out here. Starting with a denialmoving to aggression (the Horsesh*t moment brought to light an obvious additional strong lack of emotional intelligence), to finally get to the point of decision-making process paralysis acknowledging by itself his decision-making incapability. In that optic, one could also argue that following Herman's theory on leader evaluation and assessmentthe man appears as self-confident (using words like "I", "me", "as a commander in chief...", "my priority"trying to ) when announcing favorable and positive measures, whereas for negative announcement or when he intends to rise up the group identityhe plays the team player card ("we don't have a strategy", "we will not be dragged into another war").
But such attitude needs to be understood through the eyes of Obama himself. As a nation-building defender, his rhetoric toward this crisis makes him face the Butter and Gun Dilemma as his short term interests are contradictory to the long term aspirations. Indeed, he is "the man who ends war"and he intends to stay so. Behind the argument of the public's war weariness, lays his own disinclination to project US power. This is to be linked to his obsessional will to distinguish himself from his predecessor G.W. Bush who liked to see himself as "the decider"making him end up taking no decision at all. And even though he made simple analogies with Yemen and Afghanistan during the decision-making process, this might as a whole, look more like an entire reversed analogy from the Bush Model, by antagonism to which, he wrote his own identity definition.
Obama's decision-making is also often reactionary to the events in the case of ISIS. A certain lack of decisiveness has also for result a lack of clarity on the strategic objectives. The firmness in the rhetoric often does not match with the concrete actions and the established goals are unrealistic with the strategy in place. He is centralizing the decision-making within a very small group of advisors and is often involved personally. His style is also characterized by the will to control and manage all the details which can be illustrated by his micro-management approach. He is not receptive to the opinions of the others a part some of the loyalists. Finally, the President Obama has a coherent system of thought dominated by the principle of non-involvement of US ground troops for combat missions which results in a some kind of inflexibility. He can be described also as opportunistic as he is using the legal justification for military actions (based on the Congress's approval or not) according to his own political agenda.
According to the Barber's typology, Obama in the case of the fight against ISIS can be described as negative-active or negative-passive President. Negative because of his non-enthusiasm about his obligation to deal with ISIS which is forcing him to go against his vision of "President ending the wars". Active because of his will to manage all the details, even those of the operational nature of the conflict and passive because of his rather reactionary approach to the dangers posed by ISIS instead of taking pro-active measures to face the threat.
The context of the crisis is threatening not only for the US, but also for its reputation and prestige as a "global power". Also, the rise of ISIS represents an even greater threat to its allies in the region which the US has to ensure a credible support to.
However, even though this issue is written in the context of the global "war on terrorism", one must not forget that this priority remains one among others in a complex international context in which the US is active, dealing with different important dossiers such as Ukraine or the US Pivot to Asia Policy.
At last, Obama's will to constitute an international coalition to fight ISIS, is based on the fact that what is important to Obama is first the nation-building at home. Therefore, burden-sharing is an inevitable element of Obama's strategy. Furthermore, we must note that having support from Arab states and privileging indigenous fighters comforts his belief that "we cannot do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves nor can we take the place of Arab partners in securing their region".
INTRODUCTION
Brazil and Venezuela are two South American regional powers, albeit with different characteristics. Brazil, as the dominant Latin American power, can be clearly defined as an emerging great power, while Venezuela enjoys more of a middle power status. However, it was mainly the latter that aspired to play a local leadership role among the South American states. It is therefore understandable that Brazil's desire to prevent Venezuela from challenging its status as a local leader has led it to try to contain the influence of its Bolivarian neighbour. The desire of both nations is to move towards the establishment of a multipolar international order, characterised by a more balanced redistribution of power. This contradictory reality raises the following question: "Brazil and Venezuela, two powers contesting the World Order: what about their visions for the construction of a multipolar World? While Venezuela challenges the very foundations of the current international system, embodied by the structures established by the United States, Brazil's stance is more moderate: unlike Venezuela, Brazil calls for major reforms of the current global order, while keeping its current fundamental structures. The aim of this analysis is to answer the question posed to us by focusing on the theoretical concept of multipolarity in international relations, which is closely linked to that of the balance of power. The latter, observed from the realist perspective of international relations, is a research task that will include factors belonging to the liberal and identity-based perspectives.
In the first place and from the point of view of the theoretical framework, the main characteristic of the state, which dominates the international system, is the ability to threaten the existence of another state. Therefore, weaker states have to form alliances to resist the superior powers. According to the balance of power theory, these alliances in a multipolar system are not based on shared values, they are built to counterbalance the dominant power.
[...]
The theme of geopolitical and strategic alliances in Latin America is illustrated by the many changes Chavez brought about after his election in 1998. Indeed, he will seize every opportunity offered to Venezuela to counterbalance US influence in South America, but also on an international scale. The determination of the new Venezuelan president is motivated by the ideas of the Bolivarian Revolution - of Simon Bolivar, a major, albeit contrasting, player in the independence of the northern colonies of the South American continent. This ideology, whose founding principles are those of 'nineteenth-century socialism', has been the driving force behind Venezuela's independence.ème Chavez's programme of exchange is "petro-diplomacy", i.e. the building of alliances through contracts for the exploitation of Venezuelan oil by foreign companies, which is anti-capitalist and therefore anti-American. Convinced of US opposition to the "Bolivarian Revolution", Chavez implemented a policy of transforming the established order of global governance, as we still know it today, into a multipolar world. The president's objective is to confront economic neo-liberalism and globalisation as a means of achieving it, in fineto actions against American interests.
[...]
Brazil, on the other hand, pursued a pragmatic, moderate policy, yet determined to establish a multipolar world in which the United States is an ally like any other. This point is crucial as it marks the ideological break between anti-American Chavism and the Brazilian position. Indeed, Lula, the workers' president of Brazil at the time, was anti-liberal, the founder of the Workers' Party, with no links to the communists or the social democrats, whose programme was entirely oriented towards the fight against the superpower and the hegemony of the dominant economic model on the planet. Lula da Silva's vision is based more on cooperation between countries opposed to the domination of the established order than on a doctrinal and ideological struggle such as that proposed by Chavez. Lula's aim will be to forge normal diplomatic and commercial links with Washington. This desire for appeasement will continue to be maintained by the Rousseff administration.
The lack of means necessary to transform the international system in order to put an end to the domination of the United States, leads Venezuela and Brazil to practice the policy of 'soft balancing' against the latter. This 'softer' form of traditional 'power balancing' seeks to increase the costs for the superpower through a series of diplomatic actions. For Venezuela, as presented in the course of this analysis, this translated into systematic opposition to any form of cooperation (in the field of narcotics, for example), the creation of alliances with countries that are ideologically close (Belarus, Cuba, Iran), by putting up obstacles in international forums (parallel organisation of anti-American summits), by formulating counter-proposals (the establishment of ALBA) and by playing on diplomatic tensions (negotiations with Russia on the deployment of missiles on Venezuelan territory, for example). All of Venezuela's actions were guided by the Bolivarian revolutionary ideology. As far as Brazil was concerned, its vision of building the multipolar world was indeed different. It did not base the international political principle of 'soft balancing' on an ideological system. Pursuing its interests pragmatically, Brazil knew that it could not exclude its powerful North American neighbour from its strategies. Therefore, it used various economic, institutional and diplomatic tools in order to reform the rules of the established order. Thus, Brazil did not challenge the foundations of this international system, such as free markets or democracy, on which it developed its power. Its approach consists of developing multilateral partnerships with all the actors on the international scene. It remains to be seen whether the visions of a new world order according to President Lula and President Chávez will find continuity in the policies of Dilma Rousseff and Nicolás Maduro.
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